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Two Notions of Circularity 
 
Abstract. Crispin Wright’s epistemic response to McKinsey’s paradox is to argue that 
introspective knowledge of the first premise fails to transmit across the semantic externalist 
entailment in the second premise to the conclusion that one has such untoward knowledge of 
the external world. This paper argues first that Stewart Cohen and Jonathan Vogel’s 
bootstrapping arguments suffer from a novel kind of epistemic circularity, which triggers 
failure of transmission but safeguards the possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. It is then 
argued that McKinsey’s paradox falls out as a special case of this template for transmission 
failure. The circularity in play is semantic: the paradox illicitly imports semantically relevant 
properties of knowledge-individuating sources into the contents of the knowledge states that 
those sources individuate by instantiating those properties. Importantly, this diagnosis permits 
the possibility of basic introspective knowledge as propounded by Tyler Burge and other 
semantic externalists. 
 
Keywords: epistemic circularity, reliabilism, semantic externalism, transmission of 
knowledge, epistemic bootstrapping, McKinsey’s paradox.  
 
I. The Incompatibilist Recipe 
On the face of it, privileged access—the thesis that a subject (S) is always able to have 
a priori knowledge via introspection of the contents of thoughts—seem incompatible 
with semantic externalism—the thesis that those contents are known a priori to fail to 
supervene on her internal features.1 Incompatibilists have deployed various strategies, 
but we shall only probe into what Brown (2004: 194) calls the consequence problem: 
the joint assumptions of semantic externalism and privileged access pave the way for 
a priori access to those external environmental features which partly determine the 
thought contents in question. But it is supposedly absurd that armchair philosophical 
theorizing should lead to a priori knowledge of the external world given a priori 
knowledge of thought contents. Consider what Davies (2003b) dubs the (MC) form: 
(1) S has mental property M 
(2) S meets non-mental condition C if S has mental property M 
                                                 
1 Four caveats: first, some prefer to call introspective knowledge ‘non-empirical’ 
rather than ‘a priori’, but as nothing hangs on this terminology we shall henceforth 
use the latter label. Second, ‘content’ is throughout understood as conceptual content. 
Third, by ‘thoughts’ we shall from now on mean occurrent thoughts. Fourth, semantic 
externalists have typically taken the failure of supervenience of thought contents on 
internal features to be justified by Putnam- or Burge-style thought experiments which 
is why the view is defined as making an a priori claim. Those semantic externalists 
who take the view to be only empirically supported do not face our incompatibilist 
challenge. See Author (2011) for more details. 
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(3) So, S meets non-mental condition C 
In order to use this schema to mount an incompatibilist argument, C must not only be 
an external condition the obtaining of which makes M a wide content mental 
property, S must also be in a position to know a priori that C obtains if she has M. For 
if S then combines that knowledge with her a priori knowledge that she has M, then it 
looks as if she can know a priori that she meets C. For instance, if M is the property of 
thinking thoughts involving the concept water, then C might be the condition that S 
has causally interacted with water. Thus McGinn (1989: 30-48) and Davies (2003b), 
argued that semantic externalists should embrace a fairly strong constraint on 
concept-possession: 
  
(CC) If the concept of X is an atomic natural kind concept, then S cannot possess 
that concept unless S has causally interacted with instances of X 
 
Here an atomic concept is one that lacks conceptual constituents, and a natural kind 
concept is one that both purports to and actually succeeds in picking out (instances of) 
a natural kind. To require that S herself has encountered water may be too demanding. 
Perhaps, as Wright (2000: 156) suggests, all that can be inferred from S possessing 
atomic natural kind concept X is that either S has causally interacted with instances of 
X or else S is a member of a linguistic community in which others have causally 
interacted with such instances. But it would be no less surprising if all that one could 
know a priori were that others have causally interacted with instances of X. So, in the 
following we shall assume a natural-kind-dependent thought view according to which 
it is a priori knowable that if S possesses the atomic natural kind concept water, then 
S has a history of causal encounters with water.2 Consequently, it is a priori knowable 
that water exists in S’s external environment if S possesses such a concept. Consider 
now the following argument for incompatibilism3:  
                                                 
2 Note three features of this view: (i) S’s grasp of water may be incomplete yet 
sufficient to think thoughts involving that concept. (ii) S can express contentful 
thoughts when uttering sentences containing ‘water’ despite the absence of water in 
the immediate vicinity. (iii) The apriority stems from armchair reflection on possible 
scenarios. On Boghossian’s Dry Earth (1998), for instance, where despite all 
appearances water has never been present, there is no atomic natural kind concept of 
water to exercise in thought for those who have always inhabited this waterless 
planet. Note that such dry-earthlings may still succeed in expressing a different 
concept of water such as the compositional concept the watery stuff. 
3 Here I am grateful to an anonymous referee. 
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(P1) If privileged access and semantic externalism are both true, then S can know 
the premises (1) and (2) of an MC-argument a priori 
(P2) If so, then S can know the conclusion (3) of an MC-argument a priori 
(P3) But no conclusion (3) of an MC-argument can be known a priori 
(C) So, privileged access and semantic externalism are not both true 
Most semantic externalists reject the natural-kind-dependent thought view on which 
premise (P1) relies. Thus, Korman (2006) argues that since the compositionality of 
concepts is an a posteriori matter, S cannot know a priori that water is an atomic 
concept. On his view, ‘water’ expresses an atomic concept only if such tokens 
successfully refer to instances of water. If all tokens of ‘water’ are empty, as on 
Boghossian’s Dry Earth (1998), then a compositional concept such as the watery 
stuff is expressed. Since S cannot know a priori whether her tokens of ‘water’ are 
empty, she cannot know a priori which concept these tokens express. Relatedly, 
McLaughlin and Tye (1998) argue that although S can know a priori that she has the 
concept water, she cannot know a priori that water is a natural kind concept. On their 
view, water is a natural kind concept only if water is a natural kind. And since S 
cannot know a priori that water is a natural kind, she cannot know a priori that water 
is a natural kind concept. After all, for all S knows a priori, water might be a motley 
kind. On this view, there is no external condition the obtaining of which follows a 
priori from the conjunction of privileged access and semantic externalism. 
Rejecting (P1) on grounds of specific views about atomic or natural kind 
concepts may get the semantic externalist off the hook vis-à-vis our incompatibilist 
argument. Nevertheless, here are two reasons why a different tack is preferable. The 
first is that there are related views according to which S can know the premises (1) 
and (2) of an MC-argument a priori. Thus, Pryor (2007) observes that Evans (1982) 
and McDowell’s (1984) view of object-dependent thoughts implies that 
exemplifications of (1) and (2) are a priori knowable. They define so-called de re 
thoughts to be related to specific objects of acquaintance in such a way that if, despite 
appearances, those objects were absent, there would be no thoughts at all. S would 
undergo an illusion of content. But they advocated a Fregean view of thoughts 
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according to which their contents are composed of a priori accessible modes of 
presentation or ways of thinking of those objects. If that’s right, an influential stripe of 
semantic externalism cannot reject (P1). 
The second reason is that since all (2) requires is that condition C be non-
mental, the (MC) form besets unrelated views too. Any putative response that relies 
on specific semantic externalist commitments is thus at best lacking in generality. 
Take a view on which C in (2) pertains to internal features of embodiment such as 
information-processing mechanisms inside the head. Consider what Davies (2003a) 
calls architecturalist entailments of the form: 
(2*) S has internal cognitive architecture A if S has mental property M 
As an example of such machinery being a priori connected to the mental Davies (op. 
cit.) offers an a priori two-stage argument for the language of thought hypothesis. If 
M is the property of thinking certain contents, the (MC) form seems to underwrite a 
priori knowledge that S has A. Gaining a priori access to such architecturalist features 
is obviously equally problematic. Or think of analytical functionalism, which 
McLaughlin (2003: 93-94) cites as subject to the (MC) form. This view holds that for 
any mental property M there is some causal role c such that it is a priori knowable that 
S has M if and only if S has an internal (physical) property that plays role c. For a 
range of mental properties M, S can also know a priori that she has M. Yet by any 
reckoning S cannot know a priori that she has an internal (physical) property that 
plays role c.4 
The upshot is that we should ideally opt for a response to the incompatibilist 
argument which is available to all semantic externalists, and which can be adapted by 
architectualists and analytical functionalists to avoid similar arguments leading to a 
priori knowledge of internal cognitive architectures or causal role-playing physical 
properties. What is needed is a diagnosis of the incompatibilist argument which 
permits S a priori knowledge of the premises (1) and (2) of an MC-argument, no 
matter what M and C are, but denies S a priori knowledge of the conclusion (3) of 
such an argument. That is to say, the aim is to find a principled way for the semantic 
externalist to reject (P2). 
                                                 
4 Davies (2003a) and McKinsey (2003) provide additional examples of views that are 
threatened by the (MC) form. These concern, for instance, indexical thoughts, color 
concepts and singular thoughts as expressed by proper names and demonstratives. 
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 One last preliminary remark is crucial. If both (1) and (2) are a priori 
knowable, the question is which epistemic principle would allow S to attain a priori 
knowledge of (3). At first blush, what is required here is not merely that knowledge, 
or specifically a priori knowledge, be closed under known entailment: 
 
(Closure) If S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows (or at 
least is in a position to know) that q  
 
This principle imposes a consistency requirement on knowledge ascriptions. Thus, 
(Closure) bans the possibility of consistently ascribing to S knowledge that p, and that 
p entails q, without also ascribing to S knowledge that q. Likewise, if (Closure) holds, 
then S cannot consistently be ascribed knowledge that p in conjunction with 
ascriptions of knowledge of the entailment from p to q and lack of knowledge that q. 
The point is that (Closure) is silent on the source of S’s knowledge that q, and so 
allows for the possibility that S’s knowledge that q is independent of the kind of 
knowledge S has that p and that p entails q. But the distinctive incompatibilist claim is 
that if privileged access and semantic externalism are true, then S could come to know 
(3) in virtue of knowing (1) and (2).5 The (MC) form is designed as a recipe for 
knowledge-transmission and not merely knowledge-preservation. What is called for is 
rather Wright’s principle (2002, 2003), roughly that6: 
 
(Transmission) If S knows that p, and S comes to believe that q on the basis of 
competently deducing q from p, then S can thereby come to know that q 
 
                                                 
5 The in-virtue-of relation is intended as logically stronger than the epistemic basing 
relation. The latter is a relation between S believing that p and a reason R, e.g. an 
experience or belief, such that R is the reason for which S holds that belief. We shall 
take the former to be a dependency relation between S knowing that p and those 
epistemic features which make S know that p given S’s true and properly based belief 
that p. In this case, S’s belief that q is based on her belief that p in that she deduces the 
former belief from the latter belief. What must be added in order for S to know that q 
in virtue of knowing that p is something about what turns S’s true belief that q into 
knowledge given the way that belief is based. See also Section II and Tucker (2010) 
who uses the in-virtue-of locution as a placeholder for whatever non-deviant causal 
relation is required for the transmission of epistemic properties.   
6 Wright (op. cit.) prefers the notion of ‘warrant’ and occasionally ‘justification’, but 
to keep things simple we shall use ‘knowledge’ throughout. 
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Here ‘deduction’ applies only to valid inferences. If p does not entail q, S can infer but 
not deduce q from p. Competence might consist in recognizing the validity of the 
inference; or so Wright (op. cit.) proposes. Maybe additional fine-tuning is called for, 
e.g. to ensure that S retains knowledge that p while deducing q from p. What matters 
for present purposes is the idea that S bears an epistemic relation to q at least in part 
because S bears that relation to p. In other words, knowledge that q is partially 
dependent in kind on knowledge that p. The claim is typically not that the very same 
kind or piece of knowledge is transmitted across entailment. While the incompatibilist 
could reasonably couch a version of (Transmission) in terms of a priori knowledge, 
other kinds of knowledge clearly fail to transmit. Thus Pryor (2004) contends that 
(Transmission) holds in Moore’s proof, but while S has merely visual, non-inferential 
knowledge that she has hands, believing that the external world exists on the basis of 
competent deduction would at most yield visual-cum-inferential knowledge.7 Let’s 
say one piece of knowledge is epistemically prior to another piece of knowledge if 
and only if the latter asymmetrically depends in kind on the former. In that case 
(Transmission) sanctions epistemic priority of knowledge that p over knowledge that 
q. That is to say, if S comes to know that q by forming the belief that q on the basis of 
competent deduction from p of which S already has knowledge, then S’s knowledge 
that p is epistemically prior to her knowledge that q. Such epistemic priority is 
inessential to (Closure). 
Here’s the plan for the remaining parts of this paper. Our contention was that a 
satisfactory response to the incompatibilist argument to the effect that S can know the 
conclusion of an (MC)-argument a priori should not hang on specific views about the 
externalist nature of concepts, our cognitive architecture or the functionalist character 
of mental properties. Only an epistemic solution will afford sufficient uniformity as it 
identifies a fault with the cogency of the reasoning behind such an argument. Such a 
solution would be independent of particular exemplifications of M and C, and so 
would be available regardless of any such specific views. In the next two sections a 
novel epistemic solution to the (MC)-argument will be expounded. Section II argues 
that while Wright correctly blames the deployment of (Transmission) in so-called 
                                                 
7 See also Wright (2007: 44-47). 
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bootstrapping arguments, his influential diagnosis implies a claim which is 
incompatible with the type of epistemological externalism that is troubled by these 
arguments. Instead a new template is developed for diagnosing a generalized notion 
of epistemic circularity as in bootstrapping arguments. Section III argues that while 
Wright also correctly takes the (MC)-argument to trigger failure of (Transmission), 
his diagnosis implies a claim which is incompatible with the type of semantic 
externalism that allegedly succumbs to this argument. Instead it is shown how the 
incompatibilist argument falls out as a special case of the improved template—one 
that exhibits a distinctive kind of semantic circularity. Finally, Section IV briefly 
sums up the foregoing arguments. 
 
II. Epistemic Circularity 
Epistemic bootstrapping is typically taken to consist in S coming to know that an 
object or process is reliable by relying (at least in part) on the reliability of that object 
or process. For example, suppose S forms the belief that the NYT is reliable by 
reading in the NYT that this newspaper is reliable. Even if S’s belief is true, it falls 
short of knowledge because S cannot intuitively come to know that such a knowledge 
source is reliable by relying (at least partially) on the reliability of that very source. 
After all, had the NYT been unreliable, S could not come to know any of its reports 
by reading them. Or suppose S comes to know by visual perception that a table is red, 
and suppose S also comes to know by introspection that visual perception produced 
the belief that the table is red. S can then come to know by reasoning that visual 
perception produced a true belief in this occasion. If S repeats that process on 
numerous occasions, S can come to know by induction that visual perception is 
reliable. But S cannot intuitively come to know that visual perception is reliable by 
relying (at least in part) on the reliability of visual perception. What exactly explains 
that intuition is a vexed question to which we shall attempt an answer in what follows. 
Vogel (2000; 2008) has argued that process reliabilism is susceptible to 
epistemic bootstrapping, and Cohen (2002; 2005) has shown that this problem can be 
generalized to evidentialist internalism, roughly the view that justification consists in 
evidence that is internal to one’s mind. As we are primarily interested in whether 
(Transmission) fails in certain arguments against—epistemological and semantic—
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externalist views, we shall from now on restrict attention to process reliabilism. Thus 
suppose a fairly unadorned version of process reliabilism (PR) is true: S knows that p 
if and only if (a) S’s true belief that p is produced by a reliable process r, and (b) the 
epistemic status of S’s belief that p is not undermined. As regards (a), belief-
producing processes are henceforth to be understood as cognitive processes such as 
those involved in visual perception, introspection, etc. As regards (b), Goldman 
(1986: 62-3, 111-2) invoked a specific non-undermining condition in terms of neither 
having misleading evidence nor believing that r is unreliable, so as to handle reliable 
clairvoyance and Truetemp cases, but (b) could well include other types of 
undermining defeat. For instance, Vogel (2008: 534-535) takes bootstrapping 
arguments to suffer from rule-circularity, which he in turn views as a kind of 
undercutting defeater of justification.8 And Brueckner (2013: 596) argues that the 
process reliabilist can simply mimic Vogel’s evidentialist response by tacking on to 
the reliabilist view such a ‘no-rule-circularity’, non-undermining condition. According 
to Brueckner, evidentialist internalism and process reliabilism can thus both avail 
themselves of the notion of undercutting defeat, as triggered by the kind of rule-
circularity that Vogel detects in bootstrapping arguments. The key point for now is 
that nothing stops process reliabilists from helping themselves to additional non-
defeater conditions as part of a response to the challenge posed by bootstrapping. 
Consider again the following bootstrapping argument:  
(4) The table is red 
(5) S’s visual perception produced the belief that the table is red 
(6) S’s visual perception produced a true belief that the table is red 
(7) S’s visual perception produced true beliefs on numerous occasions 
(8) S’s visual perception is reliable 
                                                 
8 Roughly, an undercutting defeater is one that undermines the connection between 
the justification for believing p and the belief that p. In contrast, a rebutting defeater is 
one that outweighs the original justification by providing some other justification for 
believing not-p. We are only concerned with types of undercutting defeat. 
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S’s beliefs in (4) and (5) are produced by S’s visual perception and introspective 
ability, respectively—both of which are reliable. (6) follows deductively from (4) and 
(5), and competent deduction is reliable. (7) repeats (6), thus amassing track-record 
evidence for the inductive conclusion (8). Memory and induction are both reliable. 
Since each step seems to be underwritten by (PR), it looks as if S is in a position to 
know (8) on the basis of knowing (1) – (7). But intuitively S should not be counting 
on the reliability of visual perception in an argument with the conclusion that visual 
perception is reliable. This raises Vogel’s (2008) rollback problem of where to cut the 
straps. We submit that S’s knowledge of (6) is problematic. Given that visual 
perception produced S’s belief in (4), S knows (4) only if visual perception produced a 
true belief on this occasion, but S should not be counting on the accuracy of visual 
perception in an argument with the conclusion that visual perception is accurate. 
Surely, to determine whether S’s visual perception was correct on this occasion, S 
would rather need to scrutinize the conditions for observation, ensure her perceptual 
apparatus is not malfunctioning, or ask another reliable perceiver to take a good look 
at the table. Apart from the intuition that knowledge of (6) requires some independent 
inquiry into the credentials of S’s visual perception, there are at least three reasons 
why this is the right place to undo S’s knowledge. (i) Cohen (2002: 317) points out 
that even if only the track-record evidence in (7) can facilitate knowledge of (8), (6) 
itself constitutes some evidential support for (8). The problem is not so much whether 
S can use the bootstrapping argument to acquire knowledge of (8), but that S should 
be able to bootstrap any evidence for (8) via that argument, whether sufficient for 
knowledge or not. (ii) White (2006: 546-547) argues that (7) provides the best 
explanation of (8), indeed it is hard to see why (7) should be true unless (8) is also 
true. So, if the argument is allowed to proceed to (7), (8) ought to follow. (iii) 
Titelbaum (2010: 120-121) observes (using a different example) that if S knows 
independently that S’s visual perception is either anti-reliable (always wrong) or else 
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reliable, then she can deductively infer (8) from (6). S can thus bootstrap knowledge 
of (8) while bypassing (7). 
 The foregoing suggests that (Transmission) fails in the argument (4) – (6).9 
Given the way S knows (4), S cannot come to know (6) by coming to believe (6) on 
the basis of competent deduction from (4) and (5) even if such deduction is reliable. 
How exactly such failure is best explained is a vexed issue. Wright (2000: 155) argues 
that certain arguments display failure of (Transmission) just in case they are such that 
(i) p entails q, (ii) p is incompatible with p*, (iii) S’s state of knowing that p is 
subjectively indistinguishable from the belief state S would be in if instead p* were 
true, and (iv) if q were false then p* would be true. Wright (op. cit.) thinks any 
argument that fits this disjunctive template triggers failure of (Transmission). The key 
feature is that S’s knowledge that p is conditional on S having antecedent knowledge 
that q. The reason is that S can know p only if S has additional knowledge that not-p*, 
which in turn requires S to already know that q. Consequently, S’s knowledge that p 
fails to transmit across the entailment to q. True, Wright prefers to cash this template 
out in terms of warrant and acceptance rather than knowledge, but since Vogel, Cohen 
and others formulate the bootstrapping problem in terms of knowledge, we shall 
henceforth follow their lead to avoid further complexities.10     
Now, in the short bootstrapping argument, p = (4), q = (6) and p* = the table is 
white with red lights shining on it. (5) is an extra premise needed to deduce q from p. 
The key contention is that knowing that q is a precondition on knowing that p. More 
precisely, the idea is that in arguments meeting Wright’s disjunctive template, S’s 
knowledge that p depends on S having default a priori knowledge that q. Since default 
                                                 
9 Strictly speaking, we need here a two-premise version of (Transmission), but in 
order to ease exposition we shall continually refer to the single-premise version. 
10 Wright’s claim (2003: 57-58) is then that warrant fails to transmit from p to q in 
cases where “…there is warrant for [p] in the first place only because [q] is 
antecedently warranted”. See also his (2000: 157). We shall return to this point. 
Compare also with Davies (2008: 365): “For one of the premises, P, the warrant, W, 
to believe P depends on an antecedent warrant to believe the conclusion, Q.” The 
same thought is expressed by Pryor (2004: 359) when he talks about type 5 epistemic 
dependence: “having justification to believe the conclusion is among the conditions 
that make you have the justification you purport to have for the premise.” 
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knowledge is non-acquired knowledge and all evidential knowledge is acquired 
knowledge, Wright’s proposal is that S’s knowledge that p depends on S having non-
evidential, a priori knowledge that q. Again, bearing in mind that Wright isn’t 
primarily concerned with knowledge, we can approximate this default, non-evidential 
epistemic standing to his notion (2003: 67) of an entitlement. Obviously, if knowing 
that q is part of what makes S know that p, then S cannot acquire knowledge that q on 
the basis of coming to believe that q by competently deducing q from p of which S 
already has knowledge. Such reasoning would be viciously circular. If the argument 
(4) – (6) did display that epistemic structure, it would beg the question when 
propounded with the purpose of convincing someone who had antecedent doubts 
about the conclusion (6). 
 The point is now that Wright’s generic explanation of why (Transmission) 
fails cannot be extended to the bootstrapping argument as levelled against (PR), even 
if, as we assume, that explanation could be extended to include knowledge.11 The 
main reason is that process reliabilists are committed to a claim which is incompatible 
with Wright’s diagnosis. Let me explain. What, according to (PR), matters for 
knowledge is primarily that S’s true belief in actual fact be produced by a reliable 
process. As Cohen (2002: 310) remarks, process reliabilists permit the possibility of: 
 
(Basic Perceptual Knowledge) S knows that p even though S has no antecedent 
knowledge that the process r that produced S’s belief is reliable 
 
where ‘antecedent’ denotes epistemic priority.12 Reflect that this principle allows for S 
to know that p even though S lacks antecedent knowledge of any kind that r is 
                                                 
11 Wright (2011: 34-35) argues that “…the easy warrant inferences involve a failure of 
transmission of warrant…” 
12 To be precise, what process reliabilists permits is the possibility of someone coming 
to know that p without prior knowledge that the process that produced the belief that p 
is reliable. That possibility is compatible with the existence of someone else who 
knows that p yet cannot help but also know (perhaps tacitly) that the process by which 
the belief that p was formed is reliable. Here I thank an anonymous referee. 
 
12 
 
reliable. Wright’s claim (2003: 70) that S knows that p only if S has antecedent, non-
evidential, a priori knowledge that r is reliable is not one process reliabilists would 
take on board. Whether that antecedent knowledge is evidential or a priori is simply 
irrelevant from their perspective. Of course reliability is just one property of r of 
which S need have no knowledge antecedent to her knowledge that p. Producing a 
true belief that p on this occasion will be another such property. Thus friends of (PR) 
will be equally happy to accept the possibility of: 
 
(Basic Perceptual Knowledge*) S knows that p even though S has no antecedent 
knowledge that the process r that produced S’s belief produced a true belief on this 
occasion 
 
To wit, (PR) has it that S knows that p as long as (a) S’s true belief is produced by 
some reliable process r, and (b) the epistemic status of that belief is not undermined, 
regardless of whether S has antecedent knowledge that r produced a true belief on this 
occasion. Again, this principle imposes no qualifications on the character of the prior 
knowledge in question. In particular, process reliabilists would balk at Wright’s claim 
(2003: 67) that S knows that p only if S is entitled “…to assume the proper 
functioning of [her] perceptual apparatus on a particular occasion.” On their view, 
having such entitlement is consistent with, but not a necessary condition on, knowing 
p. That is to say, S can know p even though S lacks antecedent, non-evidential, a 
priori knowledge that r produced a true belief on this occasion. As far as they are 
concerned whether the latter knowledge is evidential or a priori is neither here nor 
there. One might suggest that failure of (Transmission) by the disjunctive template is 
compatible with (PR) if such failure is classified as a way for the epistemic status of 
S’s belief to be undermined. True, but in that case (PR) would be incompatible with 
(Basic Perceptual Knowledge*). For condition (b) would then include a type of 
undermining defeat which would rule out the possibility of (Basic Perceptual 
Knowledge*). 
 The upshot is that Wright’s disjunctive template implies the falsity of a claim, 
which is part and parcel of process reliabilism, namely the possibility of (Basic 
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Perceptual Knowledge*). Consequently, process reliabilists cannot consistently help 
themselves to that template as part of a response to the bootstrapping argument. Bear 
in mind that such disagreement over basic knowledge is consistent with commitment 
to the possibility of knowledge that is not acquired on the basis of inference from 
some other known proposition. In fact, Wright (2003: 62, 70) explicitly applies his 
template to non-inferential epistemic standings: perception and other cognitive 
faculties provide non-inferential knowledge (or warrant) conditional on having 
antecedent entitlements to rely on those faculties. And process reliabilists are also 
keen to embrace the acquisition of knowledge directly via the reliable and accurate 
operation of some such faculties. The key difference is that only process reliabilists 
can endorse the combination of non-inferential and basic perceptual knowledge. On 
their view, there simply is no need for antecedent knowledge of any kind that the 
belief-producing process instantiates any of the epistemic properties in virtue of 
which the belief counts as knowledge.13  
 As mentioned above, the foregoing appears to ignore an important feature of 
Wright’s entitlements. In (2004: 176-177) Wright proposes that an entitlement renders 
a proposition worthy of acceptance (or trust) but not belief. If knowledge requires 
belief and not mere acceptance, it thus seems as if, after all, his view is consistent 
with the possibility of (Basic Perceptual Knowledge*). In response, note that Wright 
(op. cit.) elsewhere suggests that acceptance be construed as a more general attitude 
that includes belief as a sub-case. So, if both entitlement and knowledge involve 
acceptance, thus understood, then Wright’s view would still be inconsistent with the 
possibility of (Basic Perceptual Knowledge*). In any case, we could avoid assuming 
that S actually forms belief in the target proposition p by simply reformulating both 
                                                 
13 For a related but different objection to Wright’s template see Brown (2003). Her 
line is that epistemological externalists would reject Wright’s first claim that in order 
for S to know that p, S must have antecedent knowledge that any incompatible and 
subjectively indistinguishable alternative p* does not obtain. S need only know that 
nearby or relevant alternatives fail to obtain. See also McLaughlin (2003: 87-89) who 
points out that not every argument that fits this disjunctive template fails to transmit 
knowledge (or warrant). The template incorrectly predicts that no valid argument 
from p, when known in some non-inferential, non-logically conclusive way, to q 
would transmit knowledge. Wright’s reply (2003, 62, fn. 4) is to change condition (ii) 
such that p* is incompatible, not with p itself, but with the reliable operation of the 
cognitive capacities involved in coming to know p. However, this amended version of 
(ii) has no material impact on the current objection to the template.    
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the bootstrapping argument and the transmission principle in terms of propositional 
justification, i.e. justification that S has to believe p whether or not S forms that belief. 
In that case, corresponding versions of basic perceptual propositional justification 
seem incompatible with Wright’s take on transmission-failure of justification.  
Here is an alternative proposal. Suppose S is in knowledge state K with 
content p in virtue of belief-producing source r (or process if you like) instantiating 
epistemically relevant property F. What counts as epistemically relevant properties of 
belief-producing sources depends to some extent on one’s preferred epistemology. So, 
epistemological externalists and their opponents might disagree whether conscious 
awareness or reliability of visual perception are epistemically relevant properties. We 
need not resolve that disagreement here. Note instead that in order for S to know that 
p in virtue of r instantiating F, S’s belief that p must be based on deliverances of r. 
Assuming a causal view of epistemic basing, this means roughly that S’s belief that p 
must be non-deviantly caused by such deliverances. For instance, if S is to know that 
the table is red in virtue of visual perception instantiating the property of being 
reliable, S’s belief that the table is red must be suitably causally connected to an 
experience of seeing the red table. But as adumbrated in fn. 3, such proper basing is 
merely a necessary condition. In order for the in-virtue-of relation to obtain it must 
additionally be the case that r instantiating F is part of what converts S’s properly 
based belief that p into knowledge. To use our example, what converts S’s properly 
based belief that the table is red into knowledge is at least in part that visual 
perception is a reliable belief-producing source, or perhaps that visual perception 
produces a justifying experience of which S is consciously aware. We can say that 
belief-producing source r constitutes a knowledge-producing source just in case (i) 
deliverances of r non-deviantly cause the belief that p, and (ii) r instantiates enough 
epistemically relevant properties to convert S’s belief that p into knowledge. 
Fortunately, we can elucidate the notion of an epistemically relevant property without 
undertaking the highly controversial task of specifying exactly which properties are 
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required for the conversion in (ii). The proposal is to understand epistemic relevance 
in counterfactual terms: 
 
(ER) If belief-producing source r generates S’s belief that p, then F is an 
epistemically relevant property of r if and only if: had r not instantiated F, then S’s 
belief state, as produced by r14, could not qualify as a knowledge state K with content 
p 
 
For instance, reliability is arguably an epistemically relevant property of visual 
perception in that the following counterfactual is true: had visual perception not been 
a reliable source of belief-production, then S’s belief that the table is red, as produced 
by that source, could not amount to knowledge that the table is red. Thus, many 
epistemological externalists insist that only reliable belief-producing sources also 
produce knowledge. But note that super-reliability, i.e. being more reliable than 
needed for knowledge, is epistemically irrelevant by (ER). Assume S’s visual 
perception would have been reliable (enough for knowledge), had it not been super-
reliable. In that case, the following counterfactual is false: had visual perception not 
been a super-reliable source of belief-production, S’s belief, as produced by that 
source, could not amount to knowledge. The same is true of infallibility in cases 
where S’s visual perception would have been reliable (enough for knowledge), had it 
not been infallible.15 That some such properties turn out epistemically irrelevant is a 
slightly odd consequence of (ER) counting properties as epistemically relevant only if 
they make the difference between belief and knowledge, as captured by the truth of 
such counterfactuals. Reliability is a difference-maker in that technical sense, but 
super-reliability and infallibility are not. 
 So far, we have assumed that S is in knowledge state K with content p in virtue 
of belief-producing source r instantiating epistemically relevant property F. Now 
assume also that S is in knowledge state K with some different content q, where some 
distinct source r* produces the belief that q. With those two assumptions in place, we 
                                                 
14 This clause is needed to avoid cases where the nearest possible world in which r 
fails to instantiate F is one where S’s belief state is produced by distinct source r* 
instantiating enough epistemically relevant properties for that state to count as a 
knowledge state. 
15 I owe this example to an anonymous referee. 
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can now identify epistemically circular arguments as those in which the conjunction 
of p and q, or in a special case just p itself16, entails Fr. Given that S knows each of 
the premises p and q, (Transmission) would then permit S to come to know Fr. Yet, S 
has knowledge of premise p in virtue of r instantiating F. In short, epistemically 
circular arguments fit the following template: 
(9) K (p) in virtue of Fr 
(10) K (q) 
(11) p & q ⇒ Fr 
(12) K (Fr) 
Consider again our short bootstrapping argument: 
(4) The table is red 
(5) S’s visual perception produced the belief that the table is red 
(6) S’s visual perception produced a true belief that the table is red 
This argument illustrates our template in the following way: (9) S knows that (4) the 
table is red in virtue of (6) S’s visual perception producing a true belief that the table 
is red; (10) S knows that (5) S’s visual perception produced the belief that the table is 
red; (11) if (4) the table is red and (5) S’s visual perception produced the belief that 
the table is red, then (6) S’s visual perception produced a true belief that the table is 
red; (12) S knows that (6) S’s visual perception produced a true belief that the table is 
red. So, the contention is that the bootstrapping argument (4) – (6) exhibits a kind of 
epistemic circularity pertaining to a distinct epistemically relevant property. Such 
circularity is typically characterized in terms of knowing a premise in virtue of a 
certain belief source being reliable or trustworthy in an argument with the conclusion 
that that source is reliable or trustworthy.17 Given that (6) pertains to the property of 
producing a true belief rather than these epistemic properties, a more encompassing 
                                                 
16 To use our earlier example, you cannot come to know that the NYT is reliable by 
reading in the NYT that it is reliable, assuming reliability is an epistemically relevant 
property of that newspaper qua belief-producing source. 
17 Alston (1986: 9-10) and Bergman (2004: 710) are cases in point. 
17 
 
characterization is called for. Importantly, our template (9) – (12) makes no special 
assumptions about which properties count as epistemically relevant. So, against the 
backdrop of that template, generalized epistemic circularity can be defined as 
follows: 
 
(GEC) An argument is epistemically circular if and only if (i) S knows at least one of 
the premises p, q in virtue of belief-producing source r instantiating epistemically 
relevant property F, and (ii) the conclusion that r has F can be deduced from the 
conjunction of the premises p & q, or in a special case just p itself. 
  
In our bootstrapping argument, p = (4) the table is red, F = producing a true belief that 
the table is red, r = S’s visual perception, q = (5) S’s visual perception produced the 
belief that the table is red, and Fr = (6) S’s visual perception produced a true belief 
that the table is red. The property of producing a true belief that the table is red is 
epistemically relevant to S’s knowledge that the table is red given that her belief that 
the table is red is based on what the table looks like. If S’s visual perception had failed 
to instantiate that property, S could not know that the table is red on the basis of 
looking at the table. According to (ER), the relevant counterfactual that tests for 
epistemic relevance is thus true. The problem is that when S puts her knowledge that 
the table is red together with her knowledge that her visual perception produced her 
belief that the table is red, she can deduce that her visual perception produced a true 
belief that the table is red—in fact given (Transmission) she is positioned to know 
exactly that. Knowledge of the first premise relies on a belief source r instantiating an 
epistemically relevant property F in an argument with the conclusion that r 
instantiates F. The argument is therefore afflicted by (GEC).18 
                                                 
18 This bootstrapping argument also exhibits a knowledge-version of Pryor’s (2004: 
358-359) type 2 epistemic dependence: in order for S to know one of the premises, it 
is necessary that the conclusion be true, and his type 4 epistemic dependence: 
evidence against the conclusion would undermine the knowledge S purports to have 
of one of the premises. Importantly, the epistemically benign arguments that Pryor 
cites as exhibiting type 2 and type 4 epistemic dependencies are not properly 
classified as epistemically circular by (GEC). So, these arguments provide no reason 
to think that (GEC) is not always an epistemic vice.  
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 The thought is then that banning such epistemically circular knowledge blocks 
our bootstrapping argument. More precisely, the generalized epistemically circular 
nature of the putative knowledge of (6) undercuts the epistemic support that (4) and 
(5) would otherwise provide for (6). Consequently, such circularity triggers failure of 
(Transmission): S cannot acquire knowledge of (6) by competently deducing (6) from 
(4) (and (5)) of which S already has visual-perception-dependent knowledge. The 
dependency claim is important: the competent deduction of (6) from (4) and (5) 
would transmit knowledge had S’s knowledge of (4) been independent of whether her 
visual perception instantiated the epistemically relevant property that features in (6). 
Note that generalized epistemic circularity triggers failure of (Transmission) even if 
competent deduction is reliable. Still, our solution is consonant with (PR) provided 
the non-undermining condition in (b) is plausibly interpreted so as to include 
generalized epistemic circularity as a kind of undercutting defeat.19 That may of 
course be challenged. After all, bootstrapping inferences might well be reliable. We 
could stipulate that S does not indiscriminately engage in what Kornblith (2009: 265) 
dubs “promiscuous” bootstrapping, but only bootstraps in cases where the pertinent 
processes are reliable. And indeed if we opt for a safety version of (PR), such as 
Vogel’s (2000: 605) neighborhood reliabilism, according to which S’s belief is 
reliably produced if and only if in most nearby worlds, p is true if S believes that p as 
a result of r, then S’s belief in (6) is safe: in most nearby worlds, S’s visual perception 
produced a true belief that the table is red if S believes just that as a result of visual 
perception, introspection and deductive reasoning.20 To be sure, the claim is not that 
                                                 
19 Pryor (2004) distinguishes between the ineffectiveness of an argument and its 
epistemic structure, Burge (2003) rejects the entailment from being dialectically 
useless to being lacking in warrant, and Bergman (2004) maintains that epistemic 
circularity is benign if only the argument is propounded in an unquestioned context. 
This raises the question of whether epistemic circularity renders an argument unfit for 
resolving doubt while still being subject to (Transmission). To provide a thorough 
answer to this intriguing question is beyond the scope of this paper, but see Wright 
(2007) and Author (2011) for further details. 
20 Reflect that S’s belief in (6) is insensitive in the sense that if S’s visual perception 
produced a false belief that the table is red, then S would still believe that S’s visual 
perception produced a true belief that the table is red as a result of visual perception, 
introspection and deductive reasoning. The bootstrapping argument is easily blocked 
if Vogel’s (op. cit.) counterfactual (or tracking) reliabilism is adopted. 
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(Transmission) fails because drawing the inference from (4) and (5) to (6) takes S 
from safe to unsafe beliefs. On this view, safe belief is merely necessary for 
knowledge. As illustrated by the non-undermining condition, process reliabilists have 
typically invoked additional conditions on knowledge, and there is no reason why the 
absence of generalized epistemic circularity should not constitute one such condition. 
An inference may thus transmit safe belief without knowledge due to the affliction of 
such circularity. To repeat, Vogel (2008: 534) takes rule circularity as an undercutting 
defeater of the epistemic structure of the bootstrapping argument, and Brueckner 
(2013: 596) shows how the process reliabilist can mimic Vogel’s response on behalf 
of evidentialism. Hence, when faced with the bootstrapping problem, process 
reliabilists can equally well embrace our proposal without inconsistency.  
 
III. Semantic Circularity 
Now, let’s revisit the incompatibilist charge posed by the (MC) form. Recall that we 
are taking for granted a natural-kind-dependent thought view on which it is a priori 
knowable that S cannot have the concept water unless water exists in her global 
external environment. We allow for S’s grasp of water to be potentially incomplete 
yet sufficient to think thoughts involving that concept. Assuming S has privileged 
access to the fact that she possesses water, we arrive at the following exemplification 
of the (MC) form in which both premises are a priori knowable: 
(13) S has the concept water 
(14) Water exists if S has the concept water 
(15) Water exists 
On the assumption that (13) and (14) are true, this argument is sound. Is it also cogent 
such that S could come to know (15) a priori in virtue of knowing (13) and (14) a 
priori? That seems incredible by any reckoning. Unless one is willing to embrace a 
priori knowledge of deeply contingent propositions of this kind, (Transmission) better 
fail in our incompatibilist argument.21 That way neither privileged access nor the 
existence of natural-kind-dependent thoughts is jeopardized. Moreover, as this 
epistemic response hangs on no semantic externalist commitments, it applies equally 
                                                 
21 In contrast to superficially contingent propositions, Evans (1979) took the truth of a 
deeply contingent proposition to depend upon some contingent feature of reality.  
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well to the other exemplifications of the (MC) form sketched in Section I. Thus 
Wright (2000: 155-156; 2003: 65-67) claims that (Transmission) fails, and the 
explanation he offers is reminiscent of the one rehearsed in Section II. Note again that 
Wright’s account is couched in terms of warrant, but since McKinsey (1991) and 
other incompatibilists speak of knowledge, we shall in the interest of simplicity 
continue to follow their lead. Now consider this alternative to (13): 
(16) S is on Dry Earth where she unawares fails to express the concept water when 
she utters sentences containing ‘water’ 
Wright’s claim (op. cit.) is then that since (13) and (16) are incompatible yet S’s state 
of knowing (13) a priori is subjectively indistinguishable from the belief state S would 
be in if instead (16) were true, S knows (13) a priori only if S has additional 
knowledge that (16) is false.22 Assuming that (16) would be true if (15) were false, S 
knows (13) a priori only if S knows (15) antecedently.23 In other words, part of what 
makes S know (13) a priori is that S already knows (15). It would therefore be 
viciously circular to think that S could come to know (15) a priori on the basis of 
knowing (13) and (14) a priori and then competently reason in the way she does. This 
means that S’s a priori knowledge fails to transmit across the entailment in (14). 
 But Burge (1988: 654) and other semantic externalists are keen to stress that 
not only can S think thoughts involving wide concepts without knowing that the 
external conditions on thinking those thoughts obtain, S can also know a priori that 
she thinks those thoughts without knowing that such enabling conditions obtain. More 
precisely, S can know a priori that she thinks wide content thoughts without knowing 
that certain external conditions obtain, or indeed that they are conditions on thinking 
those thoughts. For instance, S can know a priori that she thinks water is wet 
involving the natural-kind-dependent concept water, and yet not know that water 
exists or even that thinking that wide content thought is conditional on the existence 
                                                 
22 In Section II Wright’s template required that the state of knowing that p be 
subjectively indistinguishable from the belief state S would be in if instead p* were 
true. Obviously, if (16) is true then S cannot even falsely believe (13). Instead the 
corresponding state in which (16) is true must be characterized as resembling the state 
S is in when she knows (13) a priori without assuming that S has the concept water.  
23 Note for the record that this assumption ignores the possibility that the closest 
worlds in which there is no water are worlds in which S is on Twin Earth. 
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of water. The conditions that must obtain if S is to think thoughts involving wide 
concepts must also obtain if S is to know a priori that she is thinking those thoughts. 
For S is thinking those thoughts in the very acts of thinking knowledgeably that she is 
thinking them. So, just as advocates of (PR) embrace the possibility of basic 
perceptual knowledge, semantic externalists endorse the possibility of: 
 
(Basic Introspective Knowledge) For a range of content-bearing, mental 
properties M and external, content-individuating conditions C which are such that C 
must obtain if S is to instantiate M, S knows a priori that she has M even though S has 
no antecedent knowledge that C obtains 
 
Now, Wright (2000: 172-173) is clear that the knowledge (or warrant) S has that (15) 
water exists antecedent to her knowledge that (13) she has the concept water must be 
a priori. For if S’s knowledge of (13) were conditional on her having empirical 
knowledge of (15), then her knowledge of (13) would be at best a posteriori. Wright 
(2003: 68) also insists that the a priori knowledge (or warrant) S has of (15) has a non-
evidential character. S has an entitlement for (15) “…conferred not by positive 
evidence for [(15)] but by the operational necessity, so to speak, of proceeding on the 
basis of such so far untested assumptions if [S] is to proceed at all.” In this case, S 
proceeds by deploying the concept water in thought and reasoning on the so far 
untested assumption that water exists in her external environment. 
 Reflect in response that (Basic Introspective Knowledge) places no special 
constraints on the character of the antecedent knowledge in question. In particular, S 
is permitted to have a priori knowledge that (13) she has the concept water despite 
lacking non-evidential a priori knowledge that (15) water exists. As far as the 
semantic externalist is concerned, whether the supposed antecedent knowledge is a 
priori or non-evidential is irrelevant. Burge (1988: 653-654; 2003: 264-265) does 
stress that in the act of thinking a thought involving a wide concept, S must 
presuppose the relevant external enabling conditions, but S need have no positive 
epistemic attitude towards them. The act of presupposing is not to be assimilated to a 
propositional attitude, let alone one that plays an epistemic role in justifying S’s claim 
to be thinking a wide-content thought. Burge (1993; 1996) argues that absent reason 
for doubt S enjoys an a priori, defeasible entitlement to rely on introspective 
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deliverances for belief-formation. The idea is that S has an epistemic entitlement to 
her beliefs about her own wide content thoughts that derives from their function in 
critical reasoning. These beliefs are an integral part of the overall procedures of 
critical reasoning that S engages in. Burge (1993: 459) thus concurs with Wright that 
S has immediate entitlements even when she cannot provide reasons or evidence for 
them: having an entitlement “does not require being able to justify reliance on these 
sources [e.g. introspection], or even to conceive such a justification.”24 Indeed Burge 
would agree with Wright’s (2003: 60) claim that in a range of basic cases S has non-
inferential knowledge of her own—wide content—thoughts. But the vital point is that 
Burge would eschew Wright’s claim that S can know a priori what she is thinking 
only if she has a positive epistemic entitlement to the external enabling conditions. 
Burge, but not Wright, can accommodate the possibility of (Basic Introspective 
Knowledge). This suggests that although Wright correctly blames the use of 
(Transmission) in the incompatibilist argument, the explanation he offers is not one of 
which Burge-style semantic externalists will want to avail themselves. 
Here is a different tack. Recall our bootstrapping template from Section II: 
(9) K (p) in virtue of Fr 
(10) K (q) 
(11) p & q ⇒ Fr 
(12) K (Fr) 
The claim is now that the (MC) form is just a special case where q = (p ⇒ Fr), so that: 
(17) K (p ⇒ Fr)  
together with (9) and (12) give rise to viciously circular knowledge. There are, 
however, three important differences. (i) While F is an epistemically relevant property 
in the bootstrapping argument, F is a semantically relevant property in the 
incompatibilist argument. (ii) While r is a belief-producing source in the 
                                                 
24 Note that while Burge conceives of entitlements as externalist warrants that need 
not be accessible or even understood, justification is a kind of internalist warrant 
involving accessible reasons. Both Burge and Wright use ‘warrant’ disjunctively to 
pick out either justification or entitlements. 
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bootstrapping argument, r is a belief-individuating source in the incompatibilist 
argument. (iii) While the in-virtue-of relation was taken to be epistemic in the 
bootstrapping argument, a semantic relation is needed in the incompatibilist 
argument. In order to avoid terminological confusion consider instead: 
(9*) K(p) by relying on Fr 
where the relying-on relation is a semantic dependency relation. The amended claim 
is then that the incompatibilist (MC) argument fits the template comprising (9*), (17) 
and (12). That is to say, both the bootstrapping argument and the incompatibilist 
argument are such that one of the premises is known as a result of a source of 
knowledge instantiating a certain property in an argument with the conclusion that 
that source instantiates that property. This structural similarity between the two 
arguments stems from the fact that both fit the same template. 
Let me explain. In Section II epistemic relevance was defined as follows: 
 
(ER) If belief producing source r generates S’s belief that p, then F is an 
epistemically relevant property of r if and only if: had r not instantiated F, then S’s 
belief state, as produced by r, would not qualify as a knowledge state K with content p 
 
The source that produces S’s belief that (13) she has the concept water is 
introspection. S knows (13) a priori in virtue of introspection instantiating various 
epistemically relevant properties such as being reliable and producing a true belief on 
this occasion. But these are not the properties to which the content of S’s putative 
knowledge that (15) water exists pertains. S supposedly acquires a priori knowledge 
that her external environment instantiates the property of containing water. According 
to the kind of semantic externalism needed to sustain the conditional in (14) that 
water exists if S has the concept water, S’s external environment is a belief-
individuating source in the sense that the content of S’s belief that she has the concept 
water is at least in part individuated in terms of that property of her external 
environment.25 Consequently, if belief states are individuated by their contents, then 
                                                 
25 Remember to keep causation and individuation separate. On a given occasion, the 
presence of water in the vicinity of S may play a causal role in the formation of S’s 
belief that water is abundant, but to say that her belief is individuated in terms of her 
external environment containing water implies (on the current view) that S sustains a 
pattern of causal-historical interactions with water. 
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S’s state of believing that she has water is individuated in terms of her external 
environment containing water. Put differently, if the content that S has the concept 
water constitutively depends in part on whether her external environment contains 
water, then so does being in a belief state with that content.26 Now semantic relevance 
can be defined counterfactually as follows: 
 
(SR) If belief individuating source r individuates S’s belief that p, then F is a 
semantically relevant property of r if and only if: (i) had r not instantiated F, then 
content p would be unavailable as the content of S’s belief state, and (ii) were r to 
instantiate F, then p would be available as the content of S’s belief state. 
  
Thus in our example, containing water counts as a semantically relevant property of 
S’s external environment by (SR): S could not be in the state of believing that she 
possesses the concept water if her external environment had failed to contain water. 
For if water were absent in S’s external environment, then she could not possess 
water, and so she could not be in a belief state with the content that she possesses that 
concept. But if water were present in that environment, then S could be in a belief 
state with the content that she possesses water. If S believes that she possesses water, 
then presumably that concept constitutes part of the content of that belief, and S must 
possess whatever concepts constitute the contents of her beliefs. Maybe the fact that 
the content of this particular belief-ascription refers to water rather than water means 
that S need not actually possess that concept, or at least imposes much weaker 
constraints on such concept-possession, but we could pick a different example, e.g. S 
believes that water is wet. It may also be that incomplete possession of water suffices 
for S to be in belief-states with contents constituted in part by that concept, but if S’s 
external environment had lacked water, then S could not even incompletely possess 
water. 
                                                 
26 Thus Burge (2010) characterizes external individuation of content in terms of 
relations of constitutive dependency between the individual and her wider 
environment. Note also that talk about belief is notoriously ambiguous between the 
content of a belief and the state of having a belief with that content. Following Burge 
(1982), we shall hereafter take it that if the contents of belief are wide then so are the 
corresponding belief states themselves. 
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Containing water is, however, an epistemically irrelevant property by (ER), 
because S’s external environment is what instantiates that property yet is presumably 
not what generates S’s belief that she has the concept water. In this case, S’s external 
environment is a belief-individuating source rather than a belief-producing source. 
Still, S could not know that she possesses water if her external environment had 
lacked water. The reason being that if S’s external environment were unfavourable in 
the envisaged manner, no content composed in part by water would be available as 
the content of one of S’s knowledge states. Hence, if knowledge states are 
individuated at least in part by their contents in just the way belief states are, then S 
could not be in a knowledge state with the content that she possesses water. This 
means that just as we distinguished in Section II between belief- and knowledge-
producing sources, we can distinguish between belief- and knowledge individuating 
sources. Consider then this take on semantic relevance: 
 
(SR*) If knowledge individuating source r individuates S’s knowledge that p, then F 
is a semantically relevant* property of r if and only if: (i) had r not instantiated F, 
then content p would be unavailable as the content of S’s knowledge state, and (ii) 
were r to instantiate F, then p would be available as the content of S’s knowledge 
state.27 
 
In the incompatibilist argument, S’s external environment is a knowledge-
individuating source that instantiates the semantically relevant* property of 
containing water. In contrast, in the bootstrapping argument, producing a true belief 
that the table is red is a semantically irrelevant* property, because S’s visual 
                                                 
27 Two comments are in order. (i) Another reason S could not know that she possesses 
water if her external environment had lacked water is simply that she would then lack 
that concept. But the factivity of knowledge does not render the property of 
containing water semantically relevant*. Moreover, take S’s knowledge that her glass 
contains no water. Obviously, if S’s external environment had lacked water, then we 
can say that the content of that state would still be true. It would just not be the 
content of a state of knowledge. (ii) The assumption that knowledge states are 
individuated at least in part by their contents might arguably be challenged, but it 
would presumably still be true that knowledge entails belief, and so a notion of 
semantic relevance as pertaining to knowledge states could be fleshed out via content-
individuation of the corresponding belief states.  
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perception is not a knowledge-individuating source that individuates S’s knowledge 
that the table is red. Indeed, as S’s visual perception is not a belief-individuating 
source either, that property is not even semantically relevant by (SR).  
 Let’s now revisit our template. In our example, p = S has the concept water, F 
= containing water, r = S’s external environment, q = if (p) S has the concept water, 
then (Fr) S’s external environment contains water. Our problem was that when S puts 
her introspective knowledge that (13) she possesses water together with her armchair 
knowledge that (14) water exists if she possesses that concept, then (Transmission) 
seems to furnish S with a priori knowledge that (15) water exists. But we can now 
explain in a way fully consistent with semantic externalist commitments why 
(Transmission) fails in the incompatibilist argument (13) – (15): knowledge of the 
first premise (13) relies on a source of knowledge-individuation r instantiating a 
semantically relevant* property F in an argument with the conclusion (15) that source 
r instantiates property F. The argument is thus afflicted by semantic circularity: 
 
(SC) An argument is semantically circular if and only if (i) S knows at least one of 
the premises p, q by relying on knowledge-individuating source r instantiating 
semantically relevant* property F, and (ii) the conclusion that r has F, distinct from p, 
q, can be deduced from the conjunction of the premises p & q (where it is possible 
that q = (p ⇒ Fr) 
    
Note that (SC) resembles our notion of epistemic circularity (GEC) in that both render 
arguments circular just in case a premise is known in part as a result of a source of 
knowledge instantiating a given property in an argument with the conclusion that that 
source has that property. That is to say, arguments are circular when they import such 
a property into the content of a knowledge state that partially obtains as a result of 
that source having that property. 
Now, the thought, corresponding to the one in the bootstrapping argument, is 
then that banning such semantically circular knowledge blocks the incompatibilist 
argument. More precisely, the proposal is that the semantically circular nature of the 
putative knowledge of (15) undercuts the epistemic support that (13) and (14) would 
otherwise provide for (15). That seems eminently plausible: if, as argued in Section II, 
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(GEC) undercuts the epistemic support that a set of premises would otherwise provide 
for a conclusion, then (SC) also constitutes a similar kind of undermining defeat. 
Accordingly, (SC) triggers failure of (Transmission): S cannot acquire knowledge of 
(15) by competently deducing (15) from (13) (and (14)) of which S already has water-
dependent knowledge. Again, the dependency claim is important: the competent 
deduction of (15) from (13) and (14) would transmit knowledge had S’s knowledge of 
(13) been independent of whether her external environment instantiated the 
semantically relevant* property that features in (15).28 
 
IV. Conclusion 
We have developed a template for diagnosing two distinct yet structurally related 
kinds of circularity such that any argument that meets this template, including our 
bootstrapping and incompatibilist arguments, trigger failure of (Transmission) due to 
the undermining nature of that circularity. The bootstrapping argument is afflicted by 
epistemic circularity: it illicitly imports epistemically relevant properties of 
knowledge-producing sources into the contents of knowledge states that obtain in 
virtue of those sources having those properties. The incompatibilist argument is 
afflicted by semantic circularity: it illicitly imports semantically relevant properties of 
knowledge-individuating sources into the contents of knowledge states that obtain by 
relying on those sources having those properties. We then argued that epistemic and 
semantic circularity undercut the epistemic support that the premises in those two 
arguments would otherwise provide for the conclusion so that knowledge fails to 
transmit across the relevant entailments. Importantly, our diagnosis is consonant with 
process reliabilism and other epistemological externalist views, which permit the 
possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. As these views are faced with the 
bootstrapping problem, their proponents can consistently adopt our template. 
Likewise, our diagnosis is consonant with a natural-kind-dependent thought view and 
other semantic externalist views, which allow for the possibility of basic introspective 
                                                 
28 It should be pretty straightforward how to apply our template to the other 
exemplifications of the (MC) form that were contemplated in Section I. For instance, 
in order to handle architectualist arguments S’s internal cognitive architecture will 
count as a knowledge-individuating source, and the property of having a certain 
syntactic articulation might qualify as semantically relevant*. In general, while some 
such exemplifications pertain to a priori entailments outward away from S, others 
concern a priori entailments downward into S’s underlying cognitive machinery.   
28 
 
knowledge. As supporters of these views are confronted with the incompatibilist 
challenge, they can also safely embrace our template.29 
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